This paper looks at the relationship between the underrepresentation of ethnic minority groups in governments and the effect on violence and conflict that is initiated by these groups. Ethnic minority groups that are underrepresented in political decision-making are likely to express their opinions outside of the political routine, by means of conflict. Three potential determinants of representation are analyzed. An increase in the effective number of parliamentary parties is expected to lead to more ethnic groups being represented and thus to a decrease in conflict. A more proportional electoral system or electoral type should lead to more parties in parliament and to a more proportionate depiction of society, thus including ethnic minority groups more adequately and decreasing conflict. An increase in the share of seats of parties classified as ethnic relative to the share of the population held by ethnic groups, the share ratio, yields more proportional representation and should therefore also result in less conflict. Empirical analysis of a sample of 52 countries consistently supports the predictions regarding the share ratio, while the rest of the theory cannot be supported reliably. The results should be evaluated with caution due to an apparent mismatch between ethnic groups and ethnic parties.
Introduction
The last months and years have been marked by ongoing political and social turbulences in various parts of the world. Civil protests and differences of opinion between Ukrainian-and Yemen, Libya and Tunisia. Several of these national revolutions were sparked due to governments or dictators not adequately representing the opinions of the people. In Libya the ethnic minority of the Berbers, who are indigenous to North Africa and make up about five percent of the Libyan population, have actively taken part in the revolutions in order to be more widely recognized. In Morocco they were successful in making their language official in 2011 (The Economist, 2011) . In Syria and Iraq the ethnic group of the Kurdish people joined in on the protests and received concessions in the form of granted citizenship in Syria (Therolf & Sandels, 2011) . The level of violence involved in those events differed greatly from solely vocal protests in Oman to civil war in countries such as Tunisia. Violent deaths and government overthrows are among the most pronounced short-term effects of the above mentioned incidences. The long-term effect is likely to be an economic disadvantage for the countries involved.
Researchers such as Bates (2001) and North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) argue that political violence and turmoil decrease countries' economic growth and prosperity. Bates states that political development "involves the taming of violence'' (Bates, 2001, p.13) . He claims that when political institutions that tame violence fail, violence leads to a slowdown of economic growth. This is because an environment marked by conflict gives very few incentives for investment and entrepreneurial spirit. North et al. (2009) state that open access orders with broad access to politics for all parts of the population, are effective in limiting violence. They therefore conclude that richer states can be commonly shown to be open access orders. Busse and Hefeker (2007) show a more financial view on the topic.
They find that government stability is significantly positively, while conflict and ethnic tensions are significantly negatively related to levels of foreign direct investment. As a result, it would be in societies' interests to avoid circumstances that enhance interstate conflicts, because those make the country less attractive for investment. The countries listed above are likely to experience a decrease in income growth and foreign direct investment accordingly.
A question forcing itself upon the reader is which factors countries, that experience high levels of violence and protests, might have in common. There might be political institutions that enhance conflict by ethnic minority groups. It is interesting to note, that the initially mentioned conflicts all involve different ethnic groups, such as Crimean Tatars in the Ukraine or Berber groups in Arab countries. This suggests that the reason for those conflicts might be rooted in political underrepresentation of the involved groups, which leads them to voice their opinion outside of the political routine. Mueller (2003, p.296) states that "the stability within the political process that is brought about by denying diverse minorities proportionate representation in the legislatures to some extent is offset by the decisions of alienated minorities to opt out of the normal political process." The act of opting out of the normal political process can result in minority groups being involved in violent conflict. According to this causal chain groups' political underrepresentation leads to violent conflict, this in turn leads to low income growth.
The problem statement for this paper is consequently whether political underrepresentation of ethnic minority groups leads to conflict of any nature, verbal or violent, initiated by those groups. I hypothesize that countries in which specified groups are relatively less represented in governments experience more conflict than countries in which groups are adequately represented. The underlying argument is that groups that are represented in government have a platform to voice their opinions and interests and can take part in shaping policies.
They therefore do not experience the need to voice their opinions by means of violent conflict.
In the next part of this paper existing theories of representation and conflict are reviewed and combined to a theoretical framework. Subsequently the methodology and research design are elaborated on, giving details about the data sources and manipulations of data for all variables involved in the empirical analysis. This is followed by the main empirical results of the statistical assessment of the abovementioned hypothesis, presenting summary statistics, correlations and regression output. Afterwards the empirical analysis is reproduced with alternative dependent variables in order to test the robustness of the prior results. Thereafter a discussion examines the results, relates them to the theory and looks at possible flaws.
Then the paper concludes with a summary of the main findings.
Theoretical Framework
Researchers such as Powell, Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino have analyzed the relation between representativeness, which depicts the degree to which ethnic groups are granted effective access to governments, and conflict. Conflict can significantly differ in severity, ranging from vocal protests over demonstrations to civil wars. In his book Contemporary Democracies Powell (1982) looks at the relation between social and economic environment and democratic performance in 29 democracies during the 1960s and 1970. The countries he includes are dispersed over all continents except Africa. One part of his analysis is on the relationship between party systems fractionalization in legislatures and violent political conflict. Party systems fractionalization describes the probability that two legislators belong to different parties. It thus shows the process of different interest groups separating themselves from other interests, so that different parties represent different viewpoints on issues at hand.
It is an approximate measure of the number of parties in a government. Powell uses the average number of riots and the average deaths by political violence per year as his measure for violence. By conducting regression analyses, he finds higher levels of conflicts in countries with relatively less parties. Assuming that linkages between parties and groups are strong, having more parties in a parliament means that more groups are represented and can influence decision-making. These groups then do not have the need to voice their opinion through violent conflict. The number of parties in a government therefore is a suitable determinant of representativeness. Neto and Cox (1997) argue that the effective number of parties in parliament (ENPP), which is the concept used in this paper's empirical analysis, is determined as a multiplicative function of the electoral system in a country and the country's social heterogeneity. The ENPP is a concept that measures the number of parties in a country, while weighing all parties according to their relative strength (Mueller, 2003) . The authors' data consists of elections during the 1980s in 54 countries. By conducting crosssectional regressions they validate their hypothesis. They find that the effective number of legislative parties on the seats level, ENPS, is significantly determined by the strength of the electoral system and by the effective number of parties on the votes level, ENPV, which in turn is determined by the ethnic heterogeneity of a country and an interaction term of the effective number of ethnic groups in a country and the median legislator's district magnitude.
Following the argumentation given above the hypothesis arises that parliaments with a higher effective number of parties are more representative of ethnic minority groups and thus have a lower level of conflict in the country at hand. Powell (2004) alerts that there can be too many parties in a parliament, which would lead to high coordination costs and the potential for vote-seat disproportionality. This can potentially weaken the explanatory power of the effective number of parties and the effect on conflict initiated by ethnic minority groups.
According to Duverger's law (Duverger, 1954) there is a strong relationship between the number of parties in a country and the electoral system that is being used. While proportional electoral systems prove to bring about more parties, plurality rule single-member district systems often result in two-party competition. Lijphart (1990) supports Duverger and argues that a higher degree of proportionality of an electoral system allows for more new and small parties and will thus produce more parties. As described above, more parties are expected to reduce the amount of conflict in a country. This relation leads to electoral systems being suitable as another determinant of representativeness. In his 1981 paper Party Systems and Political Systems Performance: Voting Participation, Government Stability and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies Powell examines the hypothesis of a relation between electoral system and conflict by looking at 28 democracies. He analyzes the relationship between party system types, which he classifies as aggregative majority, responsible majority or representative, and political performance, of which violence is one indicator. His standardized regression analysis finds that majority electoral systems are related to higher levels of violent conflict. On the contrary, proportional electoral systems seem to be successful in containing violence. The reasoning suggests that while in a proportional system, ethnic minorities or more specifically the parties that they associate themselves with, are represented proportionally to their share of the electoral franchise, in majority systems they could not gather enough votes to enter the parliament and are thus underrepresented in governments. Looking at the representation of women in parliament, Matland and Studlar (1996) claim that women are better represented in proportional electoral systems than in plurality rule systems with single-member districts. They argue that a contagion effect forces parties to represent women if another party does so, which is more likely the more parties there are, as is the case in proportional systems. They support their hypothesis by looking at the two cases of Norway and Canada, which both have multiparty systems. The same contagion effect might be present when looking at the representation of different ethnic groups in parliaments. This argumentation gives another justification for using the type of electoral system as a relevant determinant of the representativeness of groups.
The theory yields the hypothesis that more proportional electoral systems lead to better representation of ethnic minority groups and are thus correlated with lower levels of conflict.
After assessing Lijphart's argumentation, Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007) argue that the mere possibility for minority groups to be represented in governments, determined by the choice of electoral system and the effective number of parties, is not the deciding factor influencing levels of conflict, but the actual representation of those groups in parliaments. Only if ethnic minority groups are actually occupying seats in parliament, they can voice their opinion and influence political decision-making. The authors therefore look at the share of seats that ethnic parties hold in parliaments as their independent variable. Their dependent variables are scores on indices of protests and rebellion initiated by ethnic groups, which they take from the Minorities at Risk dataset (Minorities at Risk Project [MAR], 2009). They find a significant negative relationship between the share of seats and protest and rebellion scores in their sample of sixteen countries of the former Soviet Union between 1990 and 2000. The empirical analysis in this paper therefore takes the share of seats of minority groups in parliament as a third determinant of representativeness. A higher share of seats held by ethnic parties is expected to be related to lower levels of conflict in countries. However this relation should only hold if the share of seats of ethnic parties is adequate relative to the share that ethnic minority groups hold of the country's population. This argumentation relates to the concept of proportional representation. If an ethnic group holds a share of seats that is relatively lower than its share of the population, the ethnic group is underrepresented and might voice its opinion through violent conflict. Creating a ratio of the share of seats divided by the share of population captures the argumentation at hand. The resulting hypothesis is that the higher this ratio is, the lower the level of conflict is expected to be. Figure 1 shows the relationships that the theory predicts between the above mentioned variables. The Effective Number of Parties should increase representativeness. Equally, a more proportional electoral system and a higher share of seats for ethnic parties relative to the ethnic groups' share of the population increase representativeness. Higher representativeness in turn decreases the amount of conflict initiated by ethnic minority groups to be taking place in a country, which should lead to higher income growth. As can be seen above, the three determinants of representativeness used here can theoretically be interrelated, such as more proportionate electoral systems leading to a higher number of political setup are in a position to influence their conflict potential and achieve higher income growth. This profound intrusion into a country's political setup might however only be attainable in the long run. It needs to be supported by the country's citizens and its decisionmakers. Furthermore it might not be desirable and desired in every country. The implications of the research at hand are thus of a rather theoretical, as opposed to a practical, nature.
Methodology
The remainder of this paper is concerned with the empirical test of the theory formulated above. Ordinary least squares regressions will be used to find out whether a statistical relationship between representativeness and conflict exists. The use of OLS regression is justified, due to the necessary assumptions of linearity, independence, equal variance and normality being met. The data used in those regressions has been collected from various databases. This induces the potential of mismatch between sources. This problem will be addressed in the discussion of the paper. 
Independent variables
As outlined in the theoretical framework, three different variables are examined as potential determinants of representativeness. The first one is the effective number of parties in parliaments on a seats level. Data is taken from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2013) . This continuous variable is calculated according to a formula initially proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) . They use the Rae index to obtain The second determinant of representativeness is the electoral system used in a country.
Using data from the IDEA database (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance [IDEA] , 2010) a distinction between three different types of electoral systems is being made. Countries can use either a voting system following plurality or majority decision rules, or a proportional representation system, or a mix of the latter two. In a plurality rule system the candidate or party with the highest number of votes wins the election, in a majority rule the winner has to have the support of more than half of the electorate. In a system of proportional representation the goal is to maximize vote-seat proportionality, so that the preferences of all citizens are presented in the government as direct as possible.
Mixed systems contain characteristics of both majority and proportional systems (Mueller, 2003) . The electoral system enters the analysis as a dummy variable with nominal categories, using a plurality/majority system as the base line. This simplifies the interpretation of regression results. In order to check whether it is the electoral system or the specific electoral type that influences conflict, the electoral type is taken as another determinant, using data from the IDEA database (IDEA, 2010) . A distinction between seven different electoral types is being made. Countries can use a first-past-the-post (FTPT) type, an alternative vote type (AV), a two-round type (TRS), a list proportional representation type (List PR), single transferable votes (STV), a mixed member proportional type (MMP) or a parallel type. The first three of those systems are used solely in plurality or majority rule electoral systems, while the MMP and the parallel type have characteristics of both plurality and proportional representation systems (Mueller, 2003) . Although other electoral types do exist, they are not represented in the sample of countries used in the analysis at hand. For this categorical dummy variable the electoral type of parallel voting is used as the base line.
The percentage share of seats of ethnic parties in parliament is taken from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2013) . The source categorizes parties according to the time-invariant classification by Lane, McKay and Newton (1997) database is however not available at the moment and collection of new data is beyond the scope of this paper. This obstruction will be explained at more length in the discussion part of this paper.
Dependent variables
The dependent variables used in this paper's empirical analysis are the protest and rebellion The severity of rebellions is ordered on a scale from zero to seven. Zero, again, stands for none being reported. One stands for fewer than six events of political banditry or sporadic terrorism, while two stands for more than six events related to campaigns of terrorism. A three indicates local rebellions, which are violent efforts to gain power. Scores four to six concern guerilla activity. Small-scale guerilla activity, class four, has fewer than 1,000 armed participants, less than six armed attacks in a year and those attacks only taking place in small areas of the country. Large-scale guerrilla activity, class six, on the contrary includes more than 1,000 armed fighters, more than six events per year and a large area 
Control variables
In order to control for possible effects of income on conflict, GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity was included as control variable, with data taken from the Worldbank statistics database (Worldbank, 2014a) . A high income is expected to decrease conflict by going hand in hand with sound political institutions that guarantee adequate representation of the population. High income can further lead to higher police presence and court systems, which are likely to reduce incentives to take part in violent conflict.
As a further control variable, the Freedom House political rights index (Freedom House,
2014) is included, following Alonso and Ruis-Rufon (2007). For this index, each country is
given a ranking on a scale from one to seven. On this scale one indicates the highest level of political rights being present, while a seven is assigned to the countries with the relatively lowest levels of political freedom. Countries with higher levels of political freedom are expected to experience lower levels of conflict. Rebellion 0.097465 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.237378 52 Table 2 gives the summary statistics for the main independent variables used in the empirical analysis. The majority of countries in the sample uses proportional representation as their electoral system. 
Main Empirical Results

Descriptive Statistics
Correlations and Scatterplots
In order to gain an initial insight into whether the hypothesized relationships hold, a correlation table is constructed, examining the correlations between the main dependent and independent variables. As can be expected, there is a strong and significant correlation between the electoral type and the electoral system used in a country. This is not surprising since several electoral types can only reasonably be used in certain electoral systems. An example is the list proportional representation electoral type, which can only be applied in a proportional representation system. Furthermore there is a significant negative correlation between the share ratio and the effective number of parties. This is reasonable because one party having a higher share of the total amount of seats in a parliament means that there are fewer seats left for other parties, holding the total number of seats constant. Thus the total number of parties is likely to decrease. The hypothesis of a higher share ratio leading to less conflict seems to be confirmed when looking at protest as the dependent variable. There is a highly significant negative correlation between the two variables. The correlation of the share ratio with rebellion on the other hand is neither significant nor of the right sign. This suggests that ethnic minority groups' response to underrepresentation is not of a highly violent nature that would qualify for the rebellion index. Citizens seem to rather respond by means of protests, such as demonstrations of different sizes. While Table 4 shows negative correlations of the effective number of parties with both protest and rebellion, these are not significant. A potential reason for this is the low linkage between ethnopolitical groups and parties classified as ethnic by Lane, McKay and Newton (1997) . A more elaborate explanation of this problem is presented in the discussion of this paper. An interpretation of the correlations of electoral systems and electoral types with the dependent variables is rather challenging. This is because the electoral types and systems are not necessarily ordered in a way that increases with the degree of proportionality in the classification index of the IDEA database (IDEA, 2010) . Therefore one should abstain from interpreting the correlation coefficients. Note. ** p < .01 * p < .05
An alternative is to examine whether there is a significant difference in the means of each countries score on the protest and rebellion indices, when grouping countries according to their electoral system and electoral type. This is done by using an ANOVA analysis as presented in tables 5 and 6. Table 5 shows that there is no significant difference in protest and rebellion score means between countries differing in their use of electoral systems. Table 6 shows a significant difference in mean protest scores between countries using different electoral types. The significance vanishes when looking at means of the rebellion scores of countries. The correlations in table 4 are supported by scatterplots of both the effective number of parties and the share ratio against both protest and rebellion. The best fit lines show a negative relation between ENPP and both dependent variables. The relation is however not strong and largely influenced by the high amount of zero scores on both indices. The scatterplot of the share ratio against the protest scores exhibits a strong negative relationship, which is supported by the significant negative correlation between the two variables. Just as the correlation between the share ratio and the rebellion scores is positive and insignificant, the scatterplot entails a slightly positively sloped best fit line. There is a highly likely bias from the high amount of zero scores on the rebellion score. 
Regression Analysis Output
The next step in analyzing whether the hypothesized relationships between the determinants of representativeness and conflict hold is to conduct ordinary least squares regression analyses with the variables involved. The final models incorporating all variables for this purpose are as follows, with the first model using electoral systems and the second model using electoral types: Table 7 presents the results for all regressions using the protest scores as dependent variable. Models one to four, in turn, look at the possible effects of the main determinants of representativeness. Models five and six examine all potential determinants except of the two control variables GDP and the political rights index together, only differing in using either the electoral system or the electoral type. Using both of these together would lead to biased results, due to the high multicollinearity between the two shown in Table 4 . Models seven and eight are the two final models, which again only differ in using either the electoral system or the electoral type. Both models add the control variables GDP per capita and the Freedom House Political Rights index. Table 8 shows the results of the same analyses being conducted with the rebellion scores as the dependent variable.
Model one in Table 7 shows a negative coefficient of the effective number of parties on the protest index score, as is expected from theory. However, the coefficient is not significant and the R-square of the regression is very low, suggesting that almost none of the variation in protest scores is explained by the number of parties in parliament only.
Model two shows that countries which use an electoral system of proportional representation experience less protest than countries which use plurality or majority electoral systems. This relation behaves as predicted by theory. Proportional representation systems aim at providing vote-seat proportionality, meaning that a party should get the same share of seats in parliament, as the share of votes it received in an election (Mueller, 2003) . This leads to better representation of the opinions expressed by citizens during an election. Therefore, ethnic minorities should be able to more effectively influence political decision-making by making their voices heard in a proportional representation system. However, as can be seen in Table 7 , the coefficient on the proportional representation system is not significant and the R-square of the regression is very low.
Model three looks at the effect of different electoral types on protest scores. While some of the expected relationships hold; the plurality rule electoral types first-past-the-post and alternative vote experience higher levels of protest, whereas countries using the list proportional representation type experience lower levels of protest, only one coefficient among the different electoral types is significant. Countries using mixed member proportional systems (MMP) suffer from significantly more protest than countries using a parallel electoral type. In an MMP system both a proportional and a majority voting system are used, with the proportional system aimed at compensating any disproportionality that resulted from the majority system. An example of a country using an MMP system is Germany, where it is used for federal level elections. MMP systems are used in order to counterbalance the unwanted parts of the "extremes" of purely proportional and purely majoritarian systems.
They are intended to create stable party systems (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001 ). Therefore it is surprising to find significantly higher protest scores in countries using MMP systems. An indepth look at the data reveals that the finding depends on the inclusion of New Zealand in the empirical analysis. New Zealand uses an MMP system and experiences the highest level of protest in the sample, along with Latvia. Excluding New Zealand from the analysis renders the coefficient insignificant. Using electoral types as opposed to electoral systems adds a high amount of explanatory power to the regression, as can be seen from the increased adjusted R-square. This suggests that not every electoral type falling under the heading proportional representation is able to yield adequate representation of ethnic groups and thus effectively decrease conflict.
Model four examines the effect of an increase in the share of seats of ethnic parties in a parliament relative to the share of a country's population held by ethnopolitical groups on protest scores. The coefficient on the share ratio is highly significant, of the expected sign and of a high magnitude. This implies support for the significant negative correlation in Table   4 and the highly articulate scatterplot in Figure 2 .
Model five examines the effect of all three determinants of representativeness, namely the effective number of parties in parliament, the electoral system and the share ratio, on protest scores. While all variables have the expected coefficients, only the coefficient on the share ratio is significant and even increases in magnitude.
Model six equals model five, solely replacing the electoral system by the electoral type. The share ratio remains significant and further increases in magnitude. As in model three the mixed member proportional electoral type comes with significantly higher protest scores than the parallel electoral type. Furthermore countries using a single transferable vote electoral type have a significantly higher amount of protest than countries using the parallel electoral type. This is surprising, because the electoral type of single transferable vote is aimed at creating proportional representation (Mueller, 2003) . Due to only two countries in the sample using a system of single transferable voting, the coefficient is however highly sensitive to potentially unobserved country characteristics. Just as when moving from model two to model three, moving from model five to model six comes with an increase in R-square, suggesting that the electoral type has more explanatory power than the electoral system. Models seven and model eight equal models five and six, but add the control variables of GDP per capita and the Freedom House index of political rights. In both models a higher political rights index score significantly but only slightly reduces the protest score. This is contradictory to expectations, since a higher score on the political rights index signifies a lower level of political rights. The share ratio remains highly significant and increases in magnitude even further. Model eight again shows a significant effect of using a mixed member proportional electoral type on protest, but the magnitude and significance level of the coefficient decrease. Including the control variables in the regression highly increases the explanatory power of the regression, as can be seen from the increase in the R-square.
As in Table 7 , Table 8 shows that all models including electoral types have far more explanatory power than the models using electoral systems. However, the overall lower Rsquares in Table 8 suggests that representativeness cannot explain as much of the variation in rebellion scores as it can explain of the variation in protest scores. Another striking difference when using rebellion as dependent variable instead of protest is that there are far less significant coefficients in the models. The share ratio, that was consistently significant in Table 7 , loses all of its significance, largely decreases in magnitude and does not consistently have the expected sign. The only variable that is significant in explaining rebellion scores is the single transferable vote electoral type. Countries using this electoral type experience more rebellion than countries using a parallel electoral type. As explained above, this relationship is likely to be highly sensitive to unobserved country characteristics.
While the effective number of parties in parliament has a negative effect on rebellion in all models, the proportional electoral system and proportional electoral types do not reliably have the sign that is expected from theory.
Robustness of the Share Ratio Coefficient
The share ratio is a consistently strong predictor of protest in the preceding empirical analysis. In order to assess whether the coefficient is robust across other model specifications, it is tested further in this paragraph. Table 9 shows that the significance of the ratio of the share of seats of ethnic parties in parliament divided by the share of the population held by ethnopolitical groups is robust across models that exclude outliers in the data. The basic model is the same as model seven in Table 7 . The second and third columns replicate the same model, but exclude outliers in the share of population of ethnopolitical groups. This is done because the average summed population share of all ethnopolitical groups in the timeframe of 2004 to 2006 is larger than 100 percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina and close to 60 percent in Kazakhstan. This indicates that the groups in these countries cannot be regarded as ethnic minorities, which are the object of the theory presented in this paper. The second column of Table 9 therefore excludes all countries with an average summed population share higher than 50 percent. The third column excludes all individual groups that have a population share higher than 30 percent before calculating the average summed population share of all ethnopolitical groups in the country. Two groups are excluded through this process; the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, making up almost 50 percent of the population, and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, making up about 37 percent of the population. Table 9 shows that the coefficient of the share ratio's effect on the protest index score remains significant, of the right sign and of high magnitude. This suggests that the share ratio is a robust determinant of representativeness. However, it should be noticed that the Rsquare of the regressions in column two and three drops relative to the basic model, showing that the explanatory power of the model decreases. Note. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
Testing Robustness: Alternative dependent variables
Protest and rebellion are not the only possible reactions to underrepresentation of ethnic minority groups. As was elaborated on above, there is a significant relation between representativeness and protest as a measure of conflict, while the relation cannot be The above formulated theory predicts positive coefficients on the determinants of representativeness, namely on an increase in ENPP, on a relatively more proportional electoral system or type and on a higher ratio of share of seats of ethnic parties divided by share of population of ethnic groups. The results should however be handled with care, since they might be picking up effects that are not influenced by representativeness. One should be cautious when putting the dependent variables protest, rebellion, voter turnout and net migration on a continuum of the strength of the reaction to ethnic group underrepresentation.
The reason for this is that the response chosen by ethnic minority group members might be influenced greatly by country characteristics and cultural factors, which are not accounted for in the empirical analysis.
Data on net migration is taken from the Worldbank statistics database (Worldbank, 2014b) . An independent samples t-test of both net migration and voter turnout, classified into two groups of either post-communist or not post-communist countries, shows that there are significant differences in the means of both dependent variables, depending on which group a country belongs to. It is therefore sensible to include a post-communist country dummy into all regressions performed with those dependent variables. Table 11 replicates the regressions of columns seven and eight in Tables 7 and 8, only changing the dependent variable first to net migration and then to voter turnout. The output using the dependent variables protest and rebellion is given for comparison. While the regressions on net migration and voter turnout almost all have higher R-squares than the ones on protest and rebellion, the consistency of the significance patterns is not given anymore. The coefficient on the effective number of parties in parliament is significant in the first column. However, the coefficient is negative in all regressions on net migration and voter turnout, contradicting the theory that a higher number of parties leads to less emigration and to higher voter turnout through the channel of better representation. The coefficient of the share ratio is significant, but of the wrong sign in the regressions on net migration, given the definition of net migration as the total number of immigrants minus the total number of emigrants. Although the coefficient changes to the expected sign in the regressions on voter turnout, it loses its significance. The theory on representativeness predicts that the use of a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral type, as used in majority electoral systems, should result in higher conflict than using a parallel electoral type, due to crowding out small geographically evenly distributed parties and resulting in two-party competition, which means that small ethnic parties are less represented (Mueller, 2003) . The coefficient on the FPTP electoral type contradicts the theory in the regression on net migration, but confirms it in the regression on voter turnout, while being significant both times. The other electoral types do not prove to be significant in the regressions and are not consistently of the expected signs. The fact that Table 11 shows different significance patterns than Table 7 hints that the three determinants of representativeness, ENPP, electoral system, electoral type and share ratio, might not be able to predict largely differing responses to underrepresentation of ethnic groups. While they are strong predictors of protest index scores, they fail to predict voter turnout, net migration and rebellion in a way that is consistent with theory. The dependent variables used in the empirical analysis are unlikely to be comparable responses to underrepresentation. This is because they cannot be easily interpreted as lying on a continuum of responses to underrepresentation that increases in severity. Table 12 Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Discussion
The theory developed in this paper predicts that higher representativeness of ethnic minority The hypothesis about the effect of the effective number of parties in parliament on conflict was not proven by the statistical analysis conducted in section four. Tables 7 and 8 consistently show negative coefficients on the ENPP and thus conform to the findings of Powell (1981 Powell ( , 1982 , who finds a negative effect of the degree of party systems fractionalization on the frequency of riots (Powell, 1981, p. 870) . However, the analysis does not show any significance of the coefficients. There are two important potential causes for the missing confirmation of the developed theory. While the number of parties increases with district magnitude as Duverger's law (Duverger, 1954) suggests, Taagepera and Shugart (1989) argue that this link might also increase vote-seat disproportionality depending on the formula used to translate votes into seats. A high Effective Number of Parties in Parliament might moreover lead to high coordination costs and government instability, because the amount of issues to be discussed and disagreed on rises (Powell, 2004) .Decreasing thresholds of votes, that parties have to meet in order to enter parliament further increase the number of parties. Misrepresentation due to vote-seat disproportionality is likely to lead minority groups to be unsatisfied with their representation and to voice their opinion in other ways. This line of argumentation conflicts with the relation hypothesized above and potentially decreases the significance and size of the coefficient found in the empirical analysis. A second potential cause is a low linkage between ethnic minority groups and political parties. This problem will be analyzed in more detail later.
The empirical analysis did not give consistent prove of the hypothesis that a more proportional electoral system or electoral type leads to less conflict. While both an electoral system of proportional representation and the electoral type of list proportional representation almost consistently show less conflict than a majority electoral system or a parallel electoral type respectively, and thus give support for the findings of Powell (1981) The last determinant of representativeness included in the theory is the ratio of the share of seats of ethnic parties divided by the share of the population held by ethnopolitical groups.
The hypothesis concerning this variable was consistently proven by the statistical analysis and is robust to the exclusion of outliers. These findings provide strong support for the argumentation of Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007) . Compared to the insignificance of the coefficients of the ENPP and both the electoral system and the electoral type, it seems that it is the actual degree of representation of ethnic groups in parliaments that matters to contain violence, as opposed to the mere possibility of representation given by a proportional electoral system or a large number of parties. However, the significance and robustness of the results should be interpreted with caution. Here the effect of a missing linkage between ethnic groups and ethnic parties comes into play again.
As becomes obvious when comparing tables A2 and A3 in the appendix, by far not every proportionality cannot be fully assessed, because the two parts of the ratio are not related to the same ethnic groups. A higher ratio could mean that one ethnic minority group is overrepresented while another group is still underrepresented.
The low-linkage problem arises partly due to the lack of a coherent database. While data on ENPP and share of seats of ethnic parties comes from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2013) , data on the population shares of ethnopolitical groups are taken out of the Minorities at Risk database (MAR, 2009) . Finding or creating a coherent database with matching data on all variables exceeds the scope of this paper and might rather be suitable for a master thesis. This lack of a coherent database presents a limitation to the research at hand. Nevertheless, a complete linkage between ethnic groups and parties is potentially unreachable, since not all groups seek having a party that solely represents their interests. In light of the recent integration debates in several countries, a complete linkage would moreover not be desirable. Several ethnic minority groups in the countries included in the sample are integrated into society to a degree that their interests align with the interests of the rest of the population. Members of these ethnic groups are integrated into and thus represented in existing bigger parties, so that there is no need for separate ethnic parties.
Examples are given by politicians such as Cem Özdemir, who is of Turkish descent and a member of the German Green party, or the African-American president of the United States, Barack Obama, who is a member of the American Democratic party. In diverse yet integrated societies it is rather usual for parties to consist of and thus represent more than one ethnic group.
Due to the lack of a coherent data source and due to missing data, the empirical analysis had to be limited to a cross-section analysis. Further research into the topic, based on more coherent data could potentially repeat the analysis in a time-series or panel data way. This might yield more insights and prove the theory this paper establishes. Furthermore, expanding the sample to include countries from Africa, South America, the Middle East and Asia can potentially yield further insights. A broader sample could yield interesting results, especially in the light of cultural differences, that might enhance differing responses to underrepresentation. Ethnic minority groups in these regions have been involved in several conflicts and could have higher tendencies to engage in violent conflict.
Conclusion
This research paper addresses the question whether underrepresentation of ethnic minority groups in governments leads to higher levels of conflict in affected countries. Groups that experience higher degrees of representativeness are hypothesized to be able to influence political decision-making and are thus less involved in violent conflict. The empirical tests presented in this paper show that a relationship between representativeness and conflict does exist. The ratio of the share of seats of ethnic parties in parliament divided by the share of the population held by ethnopolitical groups has the most explanatory power in predicting protest scores. It is the only consistently significant determinant of representativeness.
Therefore only one part of the developed theory can be proven by means of data analysis.
An interpretation of the results should be done with caution due to data limitations and an apparent mismatch between ethnic parties and ethnic groups. Furthermore the theory only yields correct predictions when looking at protest levels as dependent variables. This suggests that representativeness is not a reliable predictor of stronger levels of violence, such as the Minorities at Risk rebellion scores, or of other potential responses to underrepresentation of ethnic groups, such as a decrease in voter turnout or an increase in emigration.
As North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) argue, countries that experience high levels of conflict encounter lower levels of economic prosperity. Table 13 shows an OLS regression of all variables involved in the analysis and examines GDP growth as the dependent variable.
Adding protest as explanatory variable increases the explanatory power of the regression by more than 50 percent. This provides strong support for the theory of North et al. (2009) . This result has important theoretical implications. While conflict might on one hand induce positive change that leads to an increase in citizens' well-being, for example when corrupt governments are overthrown, it can also significantly decrease economic prosperity in the long-run. Countries that are in a transition or infancy period, where they have the power to shape their government, would be well-advised to grant appropriate proportional representation to all ethnic minority groups. This can greatly improve the citizens' long-run well-being by resulting in high GDP growth. Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05
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